Department of Radiology-Annual Report-July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998

Department of Radiology Annual Executive Summary Report, July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States. 103 pages

Capitated Contracting in the Department of Radiology

No abstract available

Firm Size and R&D Intensity: A Re-Examination

Using data from the Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business Program and survey measures of technological opportunity and appropriability conditions, this paper finds that overall firm size has a very small, statistically in- significant effect on business unit R & D intensity when either fixed industry effects or measured industry characteristics are taken into account. Business unit size has no effect on the R & D intensity of business units that perform R & D, but it affects the probability of conducting R & D. Business unit and firm size jointly explain less than one per cent of the variance in R & D intensity; industry effects explain nearly half the variance.

Turf wars in radiology: what must academic radiology do?

In a previous article in this series, we called upon private practice radiology groups to better support radiology research financially, but also pointed out that academic radiology must make some changes as well. In this article, we discuss those changes in detail. They include revising the structure of the radiology residency, changing the timing of the American Board of Radiology oral examinations, requiring that all residents receive research training, and emphasizing the value of clinical and translational research. The Society of Chairmen of Academic Radiology Departments (SCARD) needs to assume a leadership role in implementing these changes

Rapid Increase in Utilization Rates of Radionuclide Myocardial Perfusion Imaging and Related Procedures Between 1996 and 1998: What are the Possible Explanations?

No abstract available

Trends in the utilization of outpatient advanced imaging after the deficit reduction act.

PURPOSE: After the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) took effect in 2007, there was concern that private office-based imaging facilities would close, that advanced imaging would shift to less convenient hospital-based facilities, and that access to advanced imaging might be restricted. The aim of this study was to see if these developments occurred during the years after the DRA. METHODS: Using Medicare data, outpatient CT, MRI, and nuclear medicine trends before and after the DRA were studied. Procedure volumes performed in private offices and hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) were tabulated separately. Volumes were tracked from 2000 to 2006 (before the DRA) and from 2007 to 2009 (after the DRA), and compound annual growth rates were calculated for the two periods. RESULTS: In all 3 modalities, growth before the DRA was far more rapid than afterward. Compound annual growth rates from 2007 to 2009 in offices and HOPDs were, respectively, +2.1% and +0.5% for CT, -1.1% and +1.0% for MRI, and -1.7% and -2.5% for nuclear medicine. Growth trends in all 3 modalities showed distinct flattening beginning around 2005 to 2006. CONCLUSIONS: From 2007 to 2009 (after the DRA), there was more rapid CT volume growth in offices than in HOPDs. Concurrently, there was some loss of nuclear medicine volume in both settings, but the loss was less in offices. Thus, in CT and nuclear medicine, offices actually fared better after the DRA than HOPDs. In MRI, HOPDs fared slightly better than offices. It thus seems that there has been no shift away from offices and as yet no loss of access to CT or MRI after the DRA. However, some loss of access to nuclear medicine does seem to have occurred

Investing in Socially Responsible Mutual Funds

We construct optimal portfolios of mutual funds whose objectives include socially responsible investment (SRI). Comparing portfolios of these funds to those constructed from the broader fund universe reveals the cost of imposing the SRI constraint on investors seeking the highest Sharpe ratio. This SRI cost depends crucially on the investor\u27s views about asset pricing models and stock-picking skill by fund managers. To an investor who believes strongly in the CAPM and rules out managerial skill, i.e. a market-index investor, the cost of the SRI constraint is typically just a few basis points per month, measured in certainly-equivalent loss. To an investor who still disallows skill but instead believes to some degree in pricing models that associate higher returns with exposures to size, value, and momentum factors, the SRI constraint is much costlier, typically by at least 30 basis points per month. The SRI constraint imposes large costs on investors whose beliefs allow a substantial amount of fund-manager skill, i.e., investors who rely heavily on individual funds\u27 track records to predict future performance